Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution based on Bell's
  inequality by Yin, Hua-Lei et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
7.
73
75
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
8 J
ul 
20
14
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution based on Bell’s inequality
Hua-Lei Yin,1, 2 Yao Fu,1, 2 Yan-Lin Tang,1, 2 Yuan Li,1, 2 Teng-Yun Chen,1, 2 and Zeng-Bing Chen1, 2
1Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
2CAS Center for Excellence and Synergetic Innovation Center of Quantum Information and Quantum Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
We propose two quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols based on Bell’s inequality, which
can be considered as modified time-reversed E91 protocol. Similar to the measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol, the first scheme requires the assump-
tion that Alice and Bob perfectly characterize the encoded quantum states. However, our second
protocol does not require this assumption, which can defeat more known and unknown source-side
attacks compared with the MDI-QKD. The two protocols are naturally immune to all hacking at-
tacks with respect to detections. Therefore, the security of the two protocols can be proven based
on the violation of Bell’s inequality with measurement data under fair-sampling assumption. In
our simulation, the results of both protocols show that long-distance quantum key distribution over
200 km remains secure with conventional lasers in the asymptotic-data case. We present a new
technique to estimate the Bell’s inequality violation, which can also be applied to other fields of
quantum information processing.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), such as BB84 [1]
and E91 [2], provides a secure way to exchange private
information. It enables a common string of random bits,
called secret keys, to be shared secretly between the two
legitimate users (typically called Alice and Bob). In prin-
ciple, QKD exploits the fundamental laws of quantum
mechanics to offer information-theoretical security [3, 4].
However, the gap between the ideal devices fulfilling the
assumptions of security proof and the realistic ones opens
various loopholes which make the system suffered from
various kinds of side-channel attacks [5–9].
In general, there are two approaches to circumvent the
side-channel attacks. The first one is trying to charac-
terize realistic devices completely in the security proofs.
This approach is quite difficult since it is almost im-
possible to have a special model that includes all prac-
tically relevant imperfections of realistic devices. The
second one is known as (full) device-independent QKD
(DI-QKD) [10, 11] whose security proof is based on the
observation of nonlocal statistical correlations (loophole-
free test of Bell’s inequality) only and as such, it does
not require detailed knowledge of the devices. A recent
DI-QKD protocol has been proposed [12], where the vio-
lation of loophole-free Bell’s inequality is not affected by
the channel losses between Alice and Bob, because it only
requires Bell test performed locally in Alice’s site. Unfor-
tunately, DI-QKD is currently highly impractical, for the
reason that it requires the legitimate users to carry out
a (full) loophole-free Bell test (very high detection effi-
ciency and space-like separation between Alice and Bob),
which is still a big experimental challenge even with the
state-of-the-art technologies [13, 14]. More importantly,
its secure key rate is very limited at practical distances
even using the novel techniques, i.e., local Bell test [12]
or heralded qubit amplifier [15].
Recent progress has been made by introducing the
novel idea of measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) protocol [16], which is built on the idea of
the time-reversed Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen protocol for
QKD [17, 18]. The measurement devices in MDI-QKD,
which can be treated as a true black box, are essentially
used to post-select entanglement states from the mixed
states between Alice and Bob. Thus, MDI-QKD closes
all kinds of detection-side loopholes. Furthermore, one
crucial advantage of the MDI-QKD is that the encoded
quantum states can use weak coherent pulses (WCPs)
combined with the decoy-state techniques [19–21] in-
stead of single-photon sources. Besides, the secure key
rate and transmission distance are comparable to that
of usual QKD protocols with entangled sources [22, 23].
An important assumption in MDI-QKD is that Alice and
Bob need to perfectly characterize the encoded quan-
tum states. The secret key distribution of BB84 pro-
tocol is based on information encoded complementary
bases, while the secret key distribution of E91 is based
on quantum entanglement. The E91 protocol is the first
QKD scheme whose security proof exploits the violation
of Bell’s inequality. As a security assumption of usual
QKD, Alice and Bob need to trust their devices (both
source-side and detection-side), the Bell test can then
be performed with the measurement data under the fair-
sampling assumption.
In this paper, we propose two QKD protocols based
on Bell’s inequality, which can be regarded as the modi-
fied time-reversed E91 protocol, denoted by P1 and P2.
The two protocols are naturally immune to all possi-
ble detection-side attacks. P1 requires the assumption
that Alice and Bob need to perfectly characterize the en-
coded quantum states. However, P2 does not require this
assumption. Therefore, P2 is more device-independent,
2which enables the system to defeat more known and un-
known source-side attacks compared with the MDI-QKD.
In contrast to DI-QKD, the two schemes proposed here
do not require the legitimate users to perform a loophole-
free Bell test. It is enough to prove our two schemes’
security based on the violation of Bell’s inequality with
measurement data under fair-sampling assumption. We
demonstrate that P1 is equivalent to the MDI-QKD pro-
tocol in the asymptotic case. Combining the conven-
tional laser sources with vacuum+decoy+signal method,
we simulate the secure key rates in the asymptotic-data
case and the finite-data case, respectively. The results of
both protocols show that long-distance quantum key dis-
tribution over 200 km remains secure with conventional
lasers in the asymptotic-data case. We present a new
technique to estimate the violation of Bell’s inequality
(the “Bell value”), which can be used to test local real-
ism without preparing entanglement states in advance.
II. NECESSARY ASSUMPTIONS
For each QKD protocol, the security assumptions play
a crucial role. In order to show our QKD protocols suffi-
ciently, we first illustrate five fundamental assumptions of
P1 and P2, which are also necessary in DI-QKD protocol
[11, 12].
First, Alice and Bob’s physical locations are isolated
and secure, i.e., no unwanted information can leak out
from the secure location. Second, they trust their quan-
tum random number generators to generate a random
output. Third, they can compute and store the classical
data with their trusted classical devices. Fourth, the two
legitimate users could share an authenticated classical
channel. Fifth, the (quantum) devices of different users
are causally independent. The last assumption is guar-
anteed when the devices’ memory is totally erased after
each process or the devices have no internal memory at
all (this assumption is necessary for defeating memory
attack [24]).
In addition to the above assumptions, the security of
P1 and MDI-QKD will be guaranteed with another two
assumptions. The first one is that the Hilbert space
of quantum state preparation is two-dimensional. The
second assumption is that Alice and Bob can perfectly
characterize their encoded quantum states (e.g., the po-
larization encoded scheme of phase-randomized WCPs).
Nevertheless, without the second security assumption, P2
still satisfy the security proof. Thus, P2 can defeat more
known and unknown source-side attacks.
Note that it is also not required Alice and Bob to char-
acterize their encoded quantum states perfectly in recent
works [25–27], but the single-photon sources assumption
is necessary. In our scheme, we use conventional laser
sources (WCPs) which make our QKD protocols more
practical and economical under current technology in-
stead of single-photon sources.
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In the following, we describe the QKD schemes in de-
tails, see Fig. 1. Alice and Bob independently and ran-
FIG. 1: (Color online) Basic setup of P1 and P2 proto-
cols. For simplicity, we consider the polarization encoding
scheme. Alice (Bob) randomly prepares two (three) settings
{A1, A2} ({B0, B1, B2}) of quantum states with phase ran-
domized WCPs. Charlie performs Bell state measurement
and the measurement results are publicly announced. A suc-
cessful Bell state measurement corresponds to the observa-
tion of only two of four detectors being clicked.
∣
∣ψ+
〉
=
1/
√
2(|HV 〉 + |V H〉 represents a click in D1H and D1V , or
D2H and D2V , while
∣
∣ψ−
〉
= 1/
√
2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉) represents
a click in D1H and D2V , or D2H and D1V .
domly prepare quantum states with phase randomized
WCPs in two settings {A1 = σz , A2 = σx} and three set-
tings {B0 = σz, B1 = (σz+σx)/
√
2, B2 = (σz−σx)/
√
2},
respectively. Then they send each pulse to an untrusted
third party Charlie, who can be anybody, even the eaves-
dropper Eve. Charlie carries out a partial Bell state mea-
surement (BSM). As is known, we cannot completely dis-
tinguish four Bell states simultaneously through singly
using linear optical element. In this paper we can only
unambiguously distinguish two Bell states {|ψ+〉,|ψ−〉}
(Fortunately, the identification of one Bell state is ade-
quate to prove security). Charlie announces through a
public channel whether he has received a Bell state and
which Bell state he has received. Alice and Bob keep
the raw data of successful BSM results and discard the
rest. The Bell value can be estimated from the raw data
of quantum states sent by Alice’s and Bob’s two settings
(bases) {A1, A2} and {B1, B2}, respectively. They post-
select the results as a raw key when Alice and Bob choose
setting A1 and B0, respectively (here, A1 = B0 = σz).
Decoy-state techniques are employed [19–21] to estimate
the yield, bit error rate and Bell value, given that both
Alice and Bob send out single-photon states (untagged
portion). One party needs to carry out a bit flip to his or
her raw data to guarantee that their raw key is correctly
correlated. Then they perform error-correction and pri-
vacy amplification with one-way classical postprocessing
to extract secure keys.
3IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a brief description of P1’s
and P2’s security against collective attacks and the main
results of secure key rate. Here, we focus on collective
attacks where Eve adopts the same attack to each system
of Alice and Bob. For the first QKD protocol, P1, only
signals originated from single-photon pulses emitted by
both Alice and Bob are guaranteed to be secure while
Eve’s information is restricted by the Holevo bound [4,
10]. Since the WCPs’ phase randomization makes the
emitted quantum states of Alice and Bob into a classical
mixture of states, it enables Alice and Bob to tag each
pulse in principle though they do not need to do so in
practice [28]. It is assumed that Eve competely knows the
information from the multiphoton components (tagged
portion). Then the information of Eve is composed of two
portions, namely tagged and untagged portion, which can
be written as (see Appendix A for more details)
χ1(A1 : E) = χ
tag
1 (A1 : E) + χ
untag
1 (A1 : E)
= (QZµν −QZ11) +QZ11H
(
eBZ11 +
S11
2
√
2
)
.
(1)
The mutual information between Alice and Bob, consid-
ering that the error-correction will leak extra informa-
tion, is given by
I1(A1 : B0) = Q
Z
µν −QZµνfH(EZµν). (2)
The secure key rate of P1 (per joint signal state emit-
ted by Alice and Bob simultaneously in σz basis) can be
written as
R1 = I1(A1 : B0)− χ1(A1 : E)
= QZ11
[
1−H
(
eBZ11 +
S11
2
√
2
)]
−QZµνfH(EZµν),
(3)
where QZµν and E
Z
µν , the overall gain and quantum bit
error rate (QBER), can be directly obtained from the
experimental results. The subscript µν means that Alice
and Bob send out WCPs with intensity µ and ν, respec-
tively. For the single-photon states, the gain QZ11, bit
error rate eBZ11 and the Bell value S11 can be estimated
by the decoy-state method. Here, the parameter f is the
error correction efficiency (we take the value f = 1.16 in
our simulation), andH(e) = −e log2(e)−(1−e) log2(1−e)
is the binary Shannon entropy function.
For QKD protocol P2, the multiphoton components
are tagged whose information will be fully leaked to Eve
[28]. Only signals originated from single-photon pulses
emitted by both Alice and Bob are the untagged portion
which can be extracted as secure keys. For the untagged
portion, we use the min-entropy to bound Eve’s knowl-
edge of the secure keys, which has been applied to ana-
lyze security in Refs. [11, 27]. Details of this part can be
found in Appendix B. The secure key rate of P2 is given
by
R2 = I2(A1 : B0)− χ2(A1 : E)
= QZ11
[
1− log2
(
1 +
√
2− S
2
11
4
)]
−QZµνfH(EZµν).
(4)
The second term QZµνfH(E
Z
µν) quantifies the amount of
information needed for the error-correction. The non-
trivial part of our bound is log2
(
1 +
√
2− S211/4
)
QZ11,
which quantifies Eve’s information.
When the phases of the WCPs sent by Alice and Bob
are fully randomized, the density matrix of the quantum
states should be written as
ρ =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2π
|√µeiθ〉〈√µeiθ| = e−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|n〉〈n|, (5)
where θ and µ are the phase and intensity of the coherent
states, respectively. Then the quantum channel can be
considered as a photon number channel [20]. The overall
gain and QBER in σz basis can be given by
QZµν = Q
CZ
µν +Q
EZ
µν =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µnνm
n!m!
e−µ−νY Znm,
EZµνQ
Z
µν = edQ
CZ
µν + (1− ed)QEZµν
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µnνm
n!m!
e−µ−νeBZnmY
Z
nm,
(6)
where Y Znm (e
BZ
nm) is the yield (bit error rate), given that
Alice and Bob send out n-photon and m-photon pulse,
respectively. QCZµν (Q
EZ
µν ) is the total gain of a successful
BSM when the polarization of the pulses sent by Alice
and Bob are different (the same) in σz basis, which repre-
sents a correct (false) measurement result. ed represents
the overall misalignment-error probability of the system.
The Bell value S11 is given by
S11 =
1
2
(Sψ
−
11 + S
ψ+
11 ) = S
ψ−
11 ,
Sψ
−
11 = 〈A2B2〉ψ
−
11 − 〈A2B1〉ψ
−
11 − 〈A1B2〉ψ
−
11 − 〈A1B1〉ψ
−
11 ,
(7)
where we use Sψ
−
11 = S
ψ+
11 because of symmetry. In our
simulation, the expectation of single-photon states 〈Ak⊗
Bl〉ψ
−
11 = 〈AkBl〉ψ
−
11 results from the successful projection
into the Bell state |ψ−〉 with appropriate setting of Ak
and Bl, where k, l ∈ {1, 2}. So the expectation is given
by
〈AkBl〉ψ
−
11 =(1− 2ed)
×
Y 11ψ
−
HAkHBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
VAkVBl
− Y 11ψ−HAkVBl − Y
11ψ−
VAkHBl
Y 11ψ
−
HAkHBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
VAkVBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
HAkVBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
VAkHBl
,
(8)
where Y 11ψ
−
HAkVBl
is a yield. The superscript 11ψ− repre-
sents that Charlie obtains a Bell state |ψ−〉 successfully,
4given that both Alice and Bob send out single-photon
states. The subscript HAkVBl represents the joint quan-
tum state that Alice sends out a positive eigenvalue corre-
sponding to the eigenstate of setting Ak while Bob sends
out a negative eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenstate
of setting Bl.
We present two methods to obtain Y Z11, e
BZ
11 and S11,
the relevant parameters which are needed to evaluate the
key rate formula above, given that Alice and Bob send
Charlie a finite number of signals and use a finite num-
ber of decoy states. We use the standard error analysis
method [29, 30] to solve this problem (a rigorous esti-
mation can be acquired by using large deviation theory,
i.e., the Chernoff bound [31]). More precisely, we com-
bine linear programming and analytical method, respec-
tively, with two decoy states, to estimate all the lower
bounds of Y Z11, e
BZ
11 and S11 within single-photon states.
Importantly, our methods are valid for arbitrary photon-
number distribution of signals sent by Alice and Bob. To
get more details of this part, please see Appendix C.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the behavior of the secret
key rates of P1 and P2 provided in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4),
respectively. In our simulation, the loss of fiber-based
channel is 0.2 dB/km. For simplicity, we assume that
all detectors are identical (i.e., they have the same de-
tection efficiency and background count rate), and their
background count rate, to a good approximation, is in-
dependent of incoming signals. We assume that the de-
tection efficiency of Charlie is 40% and the background
count rate is 3×10−6. We use an intrinsic error rate that
represents the misalignment and instability of the optical
system. Furthermore, the security bound is fixed to be
ǫ = 10−10.
The secure key rates of P1 and P2 in the asymptotic
case are shown in Fig. 2 with blue dashed curve and black
dashed curve, respectively. Meanwhile, we also present
the simulation result of the MDI-QKD [16] with the red
solid curve. We can see clearly that the secure key rate
and secure distance of P1 are the same as MDI-QKD’s
in the asymptotic case. The reason lies in that the secu-
rity proof based on entanglement distillation purification
is equivalent to direct information-theoretic arguments
with one-way classical communications. The secure key
rate and secure distance of P2 are both less than P1’s,
since P2 requires fewer security assumptions, i.e., we do
not require that Alice and Bob perfectly characterize
their encoded quantum states.
In practice, we need to consider a finite number of de-
coy states. The simulation results using linear program-
ming and analytical method with vacuum+decoy states
in asymptotic-data case (finite-data case) are shown in
Fig. 3 (Fig. 4). Notice that the key rates using the ana-
lytical method almost overlap with the one using linear
programming in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. In the asymptotic-
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The secure key rates in asymptotic
case. Asymptotic case means that Alice and Bob use infinite
number of decoy states and send Charlie infinite data signals.
We use the following practical experimental parameters: the
detection efficiency ηd of Charlie is 40%, the intrinsic loss co-
efficient β of the standard telecom fiber channel is 0.2 dB/km,
the overall misalignment-error probability ed of the system is
1.5%, the background count rate pd is 3× 10−6, the intensity
of signal state µ is 0.3.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The secure key rates with two decoy
states in asymptotic-data case. The intensities of signal state
µ and one decoy state ν are 0.3 and 0.01, respectively, while
the other decoy state is a vacuum state. We emphasize that
the key rates with analytical method of Appendix C almost
overlap with the one with linear programming, which shows
that the analytical method provides an excellent estimation.
The estimation using two decoy states gives a secure key rate
which is nearly the same as the one using infinite decoy states.
Therefore, two decoy states (vacuum+decoy) are enough for
a near-optimal estimation, no matter how many decoy states
are added, the secure key rate cannot be improved too much.
In the asymptotic-data and two decoy states case, the security
distances of P1 and P2 are more than 200 km.
data case (Fig. 3), the blue (black) solid curve represents
the secure key rate of P1 (P2) under linear programming,
while the red (green) dashed curve represents the secure
key rate of P1 (P2) under analytical method. Comparing
Fig. 2 with Fig. 3, we can see clearly that the key rates
with two decoy states (vacuum+decoy) are close to the
5corresponding ones with infinite number of decoy states.
In finite-data case (Fig. 4), the statistical fluctuations are
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The secure key rates with statistical
fluctuations. The intensities of signal state µ and one decoy
state ν are 0.3 and 0.01, respectively, while the other decoy
state is a vacuum state. The finite data is N = 1014, the
secure bound is ǫ = 10−10. In the finite-data and two decoy
states case, the security distance of P1 is more than 150 km,
and the security distance of P2 is more than 110 km.
simulated using the standard error analysis method [29].
For simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob send same
number of pulses for all µAk ⊎ νBl channels, denoted by
N (an efficient parameter optimization method can be
found in [32]). Here µAk ⊎ νBl is defined as the case
that Alice sends out WCPs of intensity µ with setting
Ak while Bob sends out WCPs of intensity ν with set-
ting Bl, where k ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In the finite-data
and two decoy states cases, the security distance of P1
(P2) is more than 150 km (110 km).
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have proposed two QKD protocols, P1
and P2, inspired by E91 and MDI-QKD protocols. As
to P1, the security assumptions and the secure key rate
in asymptotic case are the same as MDI-QKD’s. More
importantly, in the security proof of P2, Alice and Bob’s
perfectly characterizing encoded quantum states is not
required. Thus, P2 is more resistant to source-side at-
tacks compared with MDI-QKD. The simulation results
show that P2 is more practical using conventional laser
sources and decoy-state method instead of the single-
photon sources. P2 depends less on device but keeps
a high secure key rate and long transmission distance.
Moreover, the Bell value can be estimated accurately
with conventional laser sources and finite-number decoy
states method. We believe that this technique can be
used in other fields of quantum information processing.
The full parameter optimization of P1 and P2 needs to
be done in the future.
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Appendix A: HOLEVO BOUND
Without loss of generality, the BB84 protocol implies
that one can compute the bound by restricting consider-
ation to collective attacks [4]. Considering the collective
attacks, the final density matrix of Alice and Bob’s joint
quantum state can be given by
ρAB =λ1|φ+〉〈φ+|+ λ2|φ−〉〈φ−|
+ λ3|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ λ4|ψ−〉〈ψ−|,
(A1)
with
∑4
i=1 λi = 1. The four Bell states
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉+ |V V 〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉+ |−−〉),
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉 − |V V 〉) = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ |−+〉),
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉+ |V H〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉 − |−−〉),
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉) = 1√
2
(|−+〉 − |+−〉),
(A2)
constitute a complete orthogonal basis in two-
dimensional Hilbert space. |φ±〉 (|φ+〉, |ψ+〉) are
perfectly correlated in σz (σx) basis, while |ψ±〉
(|φ−〉, |ψ−〉) are perfectly anticorrelated. Therefore, the
bit error rates in σz and σx basis are given by
eBZ = λ3 + λ4, e
BX = λ2 + λ4. (A3)
The phase error rates in the two bases are
ePZ = λ2 + λ4 = e
BX , ePX = λ3 + λ4 = e
BZ . (A4)
The secure key rate of the entanglement distillation
purification-based QKD using one-way classical commu-
nications is [33, 34]
REDP = 1−H(eBZ)−H(ePZ) = 1−H(eBZ)−H(eBX).
(A5)
Here, we use Holevo bound to estimate Eve’s informa-
tion [35, 36],
χ(A : E) = S(ρE)− 1
2
S(ρE|0)−
1
2
S(ρE|1)
= H(eBX),
(A6)
and the secure key rate is
RInf = I(A : B)− χ(A : E)
= 1−H(eBZ)−H(eBX) = REDP .
(A7)
6We can see that the security proof based on entan-
glement distillation purification is equivalent to direct
information-theoretic arguments with one-way classical
communications.
The Bell operator can be written as
B = A1 ⊗B1 +A1 ⊗B2 +A2 ⊗B1 −A2 ⊗B2
=
√
2(σz ⊗ σz + σx ⊗ σx).
(A8)
Thus, the Bell value is given by [10]
S = Tr(BρAB)
=
√
2Tr((σz ⊗ σz + σx ⊗ σx)ρAB)
= 2
√
2(λ1 − λ4)
= 2
√
2(1− eBZ − eBX).
(A9)
Instead of using the bit error rate eBX in σx basis, the
parameter from which Eve’s information is inferred is
the average Bell value S and the bit error rate eBZ in σz
basis, i.e., eBX = 1− eBZ − S/2√2.
Consider that Alice and Bob encode their bits in
the polarization degrees of freedom of phase-randomized
WCPs. The information of Eve with two portions [28],
i.e., tagged and untagged portion, can be written as
χ1(A1 : E) = χ
tag
1 (A1 : E) + χ
untag
1 (A1 : E)
= (QZµν −QZ11) +QZ11H
(
1− eBZ11 −
S11
2
√
2
)
= (QZµν −QZ11) +QZ11H
(
eBZ11 +
S11
2
√
2
)
,
(A10)
where the superscripts tag and untag represent tagged
portion and untagged portion, respectively. The mutual
information between Alice and Bob, considering that the
error-correction will leak extra information, is given by
I1(A1 : B0) = Q
Z
µν −QZµνfH(EZµν). (A11)
Finally, the secure key rate of P1 is given by
R1 = I1(A1 : B0)− χ1(A1 : E)
= QZ11
[
1−H
(
eBZ11 +
S11
2
√
2
)]
−QZµνfH(EZµν).
(A12)
Appendix B: MIN-ENTROPY
In this part, the goal is to guarantee the security proof
of P2 although removing the assumption that encoded
quantum states need to be characterized perfectly. Ob-
viously, the first five assumptions in section II are also
required in the security proof of DI-QKD. The secure
key rate of DI-QKD [11] is
R = HDImin(A1|E)−HDIcon(A1|B0), (B1)
where
HDImin(A1|E) = −log2Pguess(a),
HDIcon(A1|B0) = H(eBZ).
(B2)
In above equations, HDImin(A1|E) is the (quantum) min-
entropy, which will be used for restricting the knowl-
edge of Eve. By employing privacy amplification, we
are able to make Eve’s information arbitrarily small.
HDIcon(A1|B0) is the conditional Shannon entropy which
quantifies the amount of information needed for error-
correction. a is the output (eigenvalue) of setting
{A1, A2}, and Pguess(a) is the maximal guessing prob-
ability which is used for quantifying the degree of unpre-
dictability of Alice’s measurement output a. The follow-
ing bound will hold in Bell’s inequality [37]
Pguess(a) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
2− S
2
4
. (B3)
In the DI-QKD scheme, the loophole-free Bell test can
ensure QKD security against untrusted detectors and ar-
bitrarily dimensional quantum systems. P2 can be re-
garded as the modified time-reversed E91 and it is natu-
rally immune to all possible detection-side attacks. The
quantum states of P2 are required to be prepared in the
two-dimensional Hilbert space, because the security of
high-dimensional quantum states will not be guaranteed
(for example, the four-dimensional separable state will
have the property of two-dimensional maximally entan-
gled state in Ref. [10]). Therefore, we can use the mea-
surement data to calculate the Bell value with the as-
sumption that the Hilbert space of quantum state prepa-
ration is two-dimensional. We use the min-entropy to
bound Eve’s information with the untagged portion
χuntag2 (A1 : E) = Q
Z
11
[
1−H2 dimmin (A1|E)
]
≤ QZ11
[
1 + log2
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2− S
2
11
4
)]
,
(B4)
where the superscript 2 dim represents that the Hilbert
space of quantum systems is two-dimensional. From the
analysis above, it is not necessarily required that Alice
and Bob perfectly characterize their encoded quantum
states. Eve will acquire more information because the
dimension of DI-QKD’s quantum systems is arbitrary.
Then the following inequality will hold,
H2 dimmin (A1|E) ≥ HDImin(A1|E). (B5)
7The secure key rate of P2 is given by
R2 =I2(A1 : B0)− χ2(A1 : E)
=I2(A1 : B0)− [χtag2 (A1 : E) + χuntag2 (A1 : E)]
≥QZµν −QZµνfH(EZµν)− (QZµν −QZ11)
−QZ11
[
1 + log2
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2− S
2
11
4
)]
=QZ11
[
1− log2
(
1 +
√
2− S
2
11
4
)]
−QZµνfH(EZµν).
(B6)
Appendix C: ESTIMATE QZ11, e
BZ
11 and S11
1. gain and error
Now, we evaluate the overall gain and QBER. Alice
and Bob prepare phase-randomized WCPs with intensity
µi and νj , respectively. The overall gain and QBER in σz
basis (Alice chooses setting A1 and Bob chooses setting
B0) can be written as [30]
QZµiνj = Q
CZ
µiνj +Q
EZ
µiνj =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νjY Znm,
EZµiνjQ
Z
µiνj = edQ
CZ
µiνj + (1 − ed)QEZµiνj
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νj eBZnmY
Z
nm,
(C1)
where
QCZµiνj =2(1− pd)2e−
ω
2
[
1− (1 − pd)e−
µiηa
2
]
× [1− (1− pd)e− νjηb2 ],
QEZµiνj =2pd(1− pd)2e−
ω
2
[
I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−ω2
]
.
(C2)
In the above equations, pd is the background count rate,
I0(2x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind,
ed represents the misalignment-error probability, and
ω = µiηa+ νjηb, x =
√
µiνjηaηb
2
. ηa = ηb = ηd× 10−βL/20
is the total efficiency including channel transmittance ef-
ficiency 10−βL/20 and detection efficiency ηd. Consider-
ing the symmetric scenario, the distance between Alice
(Bob) and Charlie is L/2.
Now, we focus on the joint quantum state. Alice
sends out a positive eigenvalue corresponding to the
eigenstate |HA1〉 = |H〉 of setting A1 and Bob sends
out a positive eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenstate
|HB1〉 = cos pi8 |H〉+ cos 3pi8 |V 〉 of setting B1, i.e.,
|HA1〉 ⊗ |HB1〉 =
∣∣eiφa√µiηa〉H ⊗ ( cos π8
∣∣eiφb√νjηb〉H
+ cos
3π
8
∣∣eiφb√νjηb〉V ),
(C3)
where φa and φb are the overall randomized phases, while
|H〉 (|V 〉) is a positive (negative) eigenvalue correspond-
ing to the eigenstate of σz basis. Then the quantum state
passing through the beam splitter and four polarization
beam splitters is given by
∣∣∣eiφa√µiηa2 + cos pi8 eiφb√ νjηb2 〉
1H
∣∣∣cos 3pi8 eiφb√ νjηb2 〉
1V
⊗
∣∣∣eiφa√µiηa2 − cos pi8 eiφb√ νjηb2 〉
2H
⊗
∣∣∣− cos 3pi8 eiφb√ νjηb2 〉
2V
,
(C4)
where the four detection modes are 1H , 1V , 2H and
2V . Therefore, the detection probabilities for the four
detectors are given by
D1H = 1− (1− pd) exp(−|
eiφa
√
µiηa + cos
pi
8
eiφb
√
νjηb√
2
|2),
D1V = 1− (1− pd) exp(−|
cos 3pi
8
eiφb
√
νjηb√
2
|2),
D2H = 1− (1− pd) exp(−|
eiφa
√
µiηa − cos pi8 eiφb
√
νjηb√
2
|2),
D2V = 1− (1− pd) exp(−|
− cos 3pi
8
eiφb
√
νjηb√
2
|2).
(C5)
The gain Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1HB1
is defined as the probability that Al-
ice sends out a positive eigenvalue corresponding to the
eigenstate |HA1〉 = |H〉 of setting A1 with the intensity
µi, while Bob sends out a positive eigenvalue correspond-
ing to the eigenstate |HB1〉 = cos pi8 |H〉+cos 3pi8 |V 〉 of set-
ting B1 with the intensity νj . Meanwhile, Charlie has a
successful Bell state |ψ−〉 measurement event. Therefore,
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1HB1
=
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
1
4
[
D1HD2V (1 −D2H)(1 −D1V )
+D2HD1V (1−D1H)(1 −D2V )
]
dφ,
(C6)
where Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1HB1
is averaged over random phases φa and
φb, φ = φa−φb. By substituting Eq. (C5) into Eq. (C6),
we have
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1HB1
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νjY nmψ
−
HA1HB1
=
1
2
(1 − pd)2e−ω2 I0(2x cos π
8
) +
1
2
(1− pd)4e−ω
− 1
2
(1− pd)3e−
2µiηa+(1+cos
2 pi
8
)νjηb
2
− 1
2
(1− pd)3e−
µiηa+(1+cos
2 3pi
8
)νjηb
2 I0(2x cos
π
8
).
(C7)
8According to the above procedures, we can also obtain
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1VB1
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νjY nmψ
−
HA1VB1
=
1
2
(1 − pd)2e−ω2 I0(2x cos 3π
8
) +
1
2
(1 − pd)4e−ω
− 1
2
(1 − pd)3e−
2µiηa+(1+cos
2 3pi
8
)νjηb
2
− 1
2
(1 − pd)3e−
µiηa+(1+cos
2 pi
8
)νjηb
2 I0(2x cos
3π
8
),
(C8)
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA2HB1
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νjY nmψ
−
HA2HB1
=
1
2
(1− pd)2e−ω2 I0(
√
2x(cos
π
8
− cos 3π
8
))
− 1
2
(1 − pd)3e−
3
2
µiηa+(1+cos
2 pi
8
)νjηb
2 I0(
√
2x cos
3π
8
)
− 1
2
(1 − pd)3e−
3
2
µiηa+(1+cos
2 3pi
8
)νjηb
2 I0(
√
2x cos
π
8
)
+
1
2
(1 − pd)4e−ω,
(C9)
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA2VB1
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νjY nmψ
−
HA2VB1
=
1
2
(1 − pd)2e−ω2 I0(
√
2x(cos
π
8
+ cos
3π
8
))
− 1
2
(1 − pd)3e−
3
2
µiηa+(1+cos
2 pi
8
)νjηb
2 I0(
√
2x cos
3π
8
)
− 1
2
(1 − pd)3e−
3
2
µiηa+(1+cos
2 3pi
8
)νjηb
2 I0(
√
2x cos
π
8
)
+
1
2
(1 − pd)4e−ω,
(C10)
and
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1HB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA1VB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1HB2
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA1VB2
,
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1VB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA1HB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
HA1VB2
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA1HB2
,
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA2HB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA2VB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
HA2VB2
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA2HB2
,
Q
µiνjψ
−
HA2VB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA2HB1
= Q
µiνjψ
−
HA2HB2
= Q
µiνjψ
−
VA2VB2
.
(C11)
2. Asymptotic case
The gain of single-photon states (untagged portion) in
σz basis, Q
Z
11, is given by
QZ11 = µνe
−µ−νY Z11. (C12)
For the asymptotic case (with infinite number of decoy
states and infinite data length), the yield and bit error
rate in σz basis with single-photon states are given by
[30]
Y Z11 =(1− pd)2
[ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pd
+ 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2d
]
,
eBZ11 Y
Z
11 =e0Y
Z
11 − (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2(1− 2pd)
ηaηb
2
,
(C13)
where e0 =
1
2
. The Bell value Sψ
−
11 of single-photon states
is given by
Sψ
−
11 = 〈A2B2〉ψ
−
11 − 〈A2B1〉ψ
−
11 − 〈A1B2〉ψ
−
11 − 〈A1B1〉ψ
−
11 ,
(C14)
where
〈AkBl〉ψ
−
11 =(1− 2ed)
×
Y 11ψ
−
HAkHBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
VAkVBl
− Y 11ψ−HAkVBl − Y
11ψ−
VAkHBl
Y 11ψ
−
HAkHBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
VAkVBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
HAkVBl
+ Y 11ψ
−
VAkHBl
,
(C15)
k, l ∈ {1, 2}. Thereinto,
Y 11ψ
−
HA1HB1
=cos2
π
8
pd
4
(1− pd)2[1 − (1− 2pd)(1− ηa)
× (1− ηb)] + pd
8
cos2
3π
8
(1− pd)2
× [(2− ηa − ηb) + 2(1− pd)(1− ηa)(1− ηb)]
+
(1− pd)2
8
cos2
3π
8
[pd(ηa + ηb)
+ (1− 2pd)ηaηb + 2p2d(1− ηa)(1− ηb)],
(C16)
Y 11ψ
−
HA1VB1
=cos2
3π
8
pd
4
(1− pd)2[1− (1 − 2pd)(1− ηa)
× (1 − ηb)] + pd
8
cos2
π
8
(1− pd)2
× [(2 − ηa − ηb) + 2(1− pd)(1 − ηa)(1 − ηb)]
+
(1 − pd)2
8
cos2
π
8
[pd(ηa + ηb)
+ (1 − 2pd)ηaηb + 2p2d(1 − ηa)(1 − ηb)],
(C17)
Y 11ψ
−
HA2HB1
=
pd
8
(1− pd)2[1− (1− 2pd)(1− ηa)(1 − ηb)]
+
pd
8
(cos
π
8
+ cos
3π
8
)2(1− pd)2[(2− ηa − ηb)
+ 2(1− pd)(1 − ηa)(1 − ηb)]
+
(1− pd)2
16
(cos
π
8
− cos 3π
8
)2[pd(ηa + ηb)
+ (1− 2pd)ηaηb + 2p2d(1− ηa)(1− ηb)],
(C18)
9Y 11ψ
−
HA2VB1
=
pd
8
(1− pd)2[1− (1− 2pd)(1 − ηa)(1 − ηb)]
+
pd
8
(cos
π
8
− cos 3π
8
)2(1− pd)2[(2− ηa − ηb)
+ 2(1− pd)(1 − ηa)(1 − ηb)]
+
(1− pd)2
16
(cos
π
8
+ cos
3π
8
)2[pd(ηa + ηb)
+ (1− 2pd)ηaηb + 2p2d(1− ηa)(1− ηb)],
(C19)
and
Y 11ψ
−
HA1HB1
= Y 11ψ
−
VA1VB1
= Y 11ψ
−
HA1HB2
= Y 11ψ
−
VA1VB2
,
Y 11ψ
−
HA1VB1
= Y 11ψ
−
VA1HB1
= Y 11ψ
−
HA1VB2
= Y 11ψ
−
VA1HB2
,
Y 11ψ
−
HA2HB1
= Y 11ψ
−
VA2VB1
= Y 11ψ
−
HA2VB2
= Y 11ψ
−
VA2HB2
,
Y 11ψ
−
HA2VB1
= Y 11ψ
−
VA2HB1
= Y 11ψ
−
HA2HB2
= Y 11ψ
−
VA2VB2
.
(C20)
3. Finite decoy-state case
In practical demonstrations, the length of the raw key
is finite, which will induce statistical fluctuations for the
parameter estimation. Here, we consider the effect of
finite length raw key based on standard error analysis
method [29, 30]. The estimations of Y Z11, e
BZ
11 and S
ψ−
11
are constrained optimization problems, which are linear
and can be efficiently solved by linear programming [30,
32].
Now, we consider an analytical estimation method
with two decoy states [38], µ2 = ν2 > µ1 = ν1 > µ0 =
ν0 = 0. The lower bound of Y
ZL
11 , the upper bound of
Y ZU11 and the lower bound of e
BZL
11 are given by
Y ZL11 ≥
1
µ22µ
2
1(µ2 − µ1)
[
µ32
(
e2µ1QZµ1µ1 +Q
Z
00
− eµ1QZµ10 − eµ1QZ0µ1
)− µ31(e2µ2QZµ2µ2
+QZ00 − eµ2QZµ20 − eµ2QZ0µ2
)]
,
(C21)
Y ZU11 ≤
1
µ21
[
e2µ1QZµ1µ1 +Q
Z
00 − eµ1QZµ10 − eµ1QZ0µ1
]
,
(C22)
eBZL11 ≥
1
µ22µ
2
1(µ2 − µ1)Y ZU11
{
µ32
[
e2µ1EZµ1µ1Q
Z
µ1µ1
+ EZ00Q
Z
00 − eµ1EZµ10QZµ10 − eµ1EZ0µ1QZ0µ1
]
− µ31
[
e2µ2EZµ2µ2Q
Z
µ2µ2 + E
Z
00Q
Z
00
− eµ2EZµ20QZµ20 − eµ2EZ0µ2QZ0µ2
]}
.
(C23)
Combining Eq. (C11) and Eq. (C20), we can use the fol-
lowing equations to estimate the lower bound of Sψ
−
11 ,
Sψ
−L
11 ≥2(1− 2ed)
×

 Y 11ψ
−L
Ha1Vb1
− Y 11ψ−UHA1HB1
Y 11ψ
−U
HA1HB1
+ Y 11ψ
−U
HA1VB1
+
Y 11ψ
−L
HA2VB1
− Y 11ψ−UHA2HB1
Y 11ψ
−U
HA2HB1
+ Y 11ψ
−U
HA2VB1

 ,
(C24)
where
Y 11ψ
−L
HAkVBl
≥ 1
µ22µ
2
1(µ2 − µ1)
[
µ32
(
e2µ1Qµ1µ1ψ
−
HAkVBl
+Q00ψ
−
HAkVBl
− eµ1Qµ10ψ−HAkVBl − e
µ1Q0µ1ψ
−
HAkVBl
)
− µ31
(
e2µ2Qµ2µ2ψ
−
HAkVBl
+Q00ψ
−
HAkVBl
− eµ2Qµ20ψ−HAkVBl − e
µ2Q0µ2ψ
−
HAkVBl
)]
,
(C25)
Y 11ψ
−U
HAkHBl
≤ 1
µ21
[
e2µ1Qµ1µ1ψ
−
HAkHBl
+Q00ψ
−
HAkHBl
− eµ1Qµ10ψ−HAkHBl − e
µ1Q0µ1ψ
−
HAkHBl
]
,
(C26)
Y 11ψ
−U
HAkVBl
≤ 1
µ21
[
e2µ1Qµ1µ1ψ
−
HAkVBl
+Q00ψ
−
HAkVBl
− eµ1Qµ10ψ−HAkVBl − e
µ1Q0µ1ψ
−
HAkVBl
]
,
(C27)
and k, l ∈ {1, 2}.
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